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Abstract
We explore a social welfare relation (SWR) deﬁned on inﬁnite utility streams which satisﬁesQ-Anonymity,
a stronger anonymity condition than Finite Anonymity. Following d’Aspremont (unpublished manuscript),
we deﬁne a speciﬁc type of SWR called simpliﬁed criterion in a general form. Then, we show that any
extension a` la Banerjee (Soc Choice Welfare 27: 327-339) of a ﬁnitely anonymous simpliﬁed crite-
rion is characterized by only replacing Finite Anonymity with Q-Anonymity in the set of conditions
characterizing the simpliﬁed criterion in question. The characterizations of the extended versions of
the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs, called Q-generalized Lorenz SWR and Q-leximin SWR
respectively, and the alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR, called Q-utilitarian
SWR, are also established as corollaries to our general characterization result.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71
Keywords: Q-Anonymity, Group of cyclic permutations, Simpliﬁed criterion, Generalized Lorenz cri-
terion, Leximin principle, Utilitarianism
1 Introduction
Consider a situation where we face an urgency of choosing one among several alternative policies which
will affect inﬁnitely many future generations as well as the present generation (e.g. environmental
policies). To deal with such a social decision problem, it is plausible to appeal a certain social evaluation
ordering which satisﬁes some reasonable conditions every future generation as well as the present one
would readily accept. If we are concerned only with each generation’s welfare measured in terms of
utility, such an evaluation ordering will be a social welfare ordering (SWO) deﬁned on the set of inﬁnite-
horizon utility proﬁles (one for each attainable utility proﬁle of an alternative policy).
A theoretical analysis on an ordering on inﬁnite-horizon utility streams has been carried out par-
ticularly in social choice theory. In the literature, it is known that there is a serious trade-off between
the condition of efﬁciency formalized as Strong Pareto and that of impartial treatment of generations
called Strong Anonymity. Strong Anonymity is deﬁned in terms of all logically possible permutations on
(countably) inﬁnite generations and asserts that two utility streams related by a permutation on genera-
tions are socially indifferent. Lauwers (1997a) shows that this anonymity postulate is logically incom-
patible with Strong Pareto.1
To avoid the problem of Pareto-Anonymity dilemma, a weakened anonymity condition called Fi-
nite Anonymity (or Weak Anonymity) has been considered to explore a strongly Paretian and (weakly)
anonymous SWO on inﬁnite utility streams. Finite Anonymity is deﬁned by conﬁning admissible per-
mutations to those which interchange ﬁnitely many generations (usually called ﬁnite permutations). It is
known that Finite Anonymity is compatible with Strong Pareto. Svensson (1980) is the ﬁrst to provide
a possibility result that there exists an ordering on inﬁnite utility streams that satisﬁes Strong Pareto and
Finite Anonymity.2 His result is established by explicitly presenting the inﬁnite-horizon extension of
the Suppes-Sen grading principle, called Suppes-Sen social welfare relation (SWR), and showing that
it satisﬁes both two conditions.3 Recently, the characterizations of several other SWRs have been also
1On this, see also the discussions by Van Liedekerke and Lauwers (1997) and in Asheim and Tungodden (2004).
2See also Asheim et al. (2001). Svensson established his result originally as a resolution to another substantive dilemma
known as Diamond’s (1965) impossibility that if an ordering on inﬁnite utility streams is required to be strongly Paretian and
continuous with respect to the sup topology, then it will inevitably violate Finite Anonymity.
3The Suppes-Sen grading principle was ﬁrst proposed in Suppes (1966) in a two-person setting and was generalized into
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established: in Asheim and Tungodden (2004), the catching up and overtaking criteria and the leximin
versions of these two criteria; by Basu and Mitra (2007), the inﬁnite-horizon extension of utilitarian
principle and the catching up and overtaking criteria; in Bossert et al. (2007), the inﬁnite-horizon ex-
tensions of the generalized Lorenz criterion and the leximin principle. While every rule we mentioned
here is a quasi-ordering, i.e. reﬂexive and transitive but not complete binary relation on utility streams,
Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) theorem ensures that there exists an ordering that respects
the ranking determined by the rule in question.
Although these existing results ﬁrmly suggest the possibility of making a SWO of inﬁnite utility
streams in a not only efﬁcient but also impartial way in the sense that both Strong Pareto and Finite
Anonymity are satisﬁed, in the literature it has often been argued that Finite Anonymity is too weak
to reﬂect the impartial treatment of inﬁnitely many generations and a stronger notion of anonymity
is needed. In the recent paper of Mitra and Basu (2005), they characterize the strongest notion of
anonymity which is compatible with Strong Pareto. They call this strongest notion of Pareto-compatible
anonymity Q-Anonymity. Q-Anonymity is deﬁned in terms of a group of cyclic permutations (see the
next section for details), and it prescribes social indifference relation for a broader class of pairs of utility
streams than Finite Anonymity does.4
In the literature, not so many efforts have been carried out in exploring a Q-anonymous social wel-
fare ordering on inﬁnite utility streams yet. Exceptions are Lauwers (1997b), Fleurbaey and Michel
(2003), Mitra and Basu (2005), and Banerjee (2006). Among them, it is only Banerjee (2006) that
establishes the characterizations of Q-anonymous SWRs.5 In his paper, Banerjee formulates the exten-
sions of the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian inﬁnite-horizon SWRs, called Q-Suppes-Sen SWR and Q-
utilitarian SWR respectively, each of which is deﬁned by using a group of cyclic permutations, and
moreover, he shows that each of his new rules is characterized by replacing Finite Anonymity with Q-
Anonymity in the set of axioms that characterizes the ﬁnite-anonymous version of the rule, the inﬁnite-
n-person case by Sen (1970).
4Q-Anonymity was ﬁrst introduced in Lauwers (1997b) by the name of Fixed Step Anonymity. See also Fleurbaey and
Michel (2003).
5It should be noted, however, that Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), adopting a less restricted deﬁnition of subrelation than
usually considered in the literature, provides the axiomatic characterization of the overtaking criterion based on the extended
utilitarian welfare relation proposed by Lauwers (1997b).
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horizon Suppes-Sen and the inﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWRs respectively.
The purpose of this paper is to explore other Q-anonymous SWRs and to characterize them. Baner-
jee’s (2006) characterizations of his extended versions of the inﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen and the inﬁnite-
horizon utilitarian SWRs suggests that for a certain class of ﬁnitely anonymous inﬁnite-horizon SWRs,
the extension a` la Banerjee of a rule can be characterized by only replacing Finite Anonymity with Q
-Anonymity. Indeed, we will show that this is true for a class of some speciﬁc types of SWRs that
includes well-established inﬁnite-horizon SWRs such as the inﬁnite-horizon leximin principle and the
inﬁnite-horizon generalized Lorenz criterion as well as the inﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen and the inﬁnite-
horizon utilitarian SWRs.
What the four inﬁnite-horizon SWRs we just mentioned above have in common is that each of these
rules determines a social ranking of utility streams by applying well-established ﬁnite-horizon criterion,
such as utilitarianism and the leximin principle, to the ﬁrst n generations in combination with the Pareto
criterion for the inﬁnite future generations (see later sections for the formal deﬁnitions). In other words,
these rules are deﬁned by the well-established ﬁnite-horizon welfare relations and the Pareto criterion.
Moreover, each of them is completely distinguished in terms of the adopted ﬁnite-horizon welfare re-
lation. Therefore, for a given ﬁnite-horizon welfare relation, we can deﬁne an inﬁnite-horizon welfare
relation that applies the ﬁnite-horizon relation to the ﬁrst n generations and the Pareto criterion to the
inﬁnite future generations. d’Aspremont (2005) refers to this type of inﬁnite-horizon relation as simpli-
ﬁed criterion generated by a (sequence of) ﬁnite-horizon relation(s) and gives an analysis on the logical
relationship between a simpliﬁed criterion and his overtaking criterion deﬁned in a general form.
In this paper, we will examine the Banerjee-like extension of a simpliﬁed criterion. First, we will
show that under a few moderate conditions on a ﬁnite-horizon welfare relation, the generated simpliﬁed
criterion will surely be reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on inﬁnite utility streams, i.e. a quasi-
ordering. Our main result is stated for an arbitrary simpliﬁed criterion which satisﬁes reﬂexivity and
transitivity. It shows that any Banerjee-like extension of a reﬂexive and transitive simpliﬁed criterion
generated by a ﬁnite-horizon welfare relation is characterized by only replacing Finite Anonymity with
Q-Anonymity in the set of axioms which characterizes the simpliﬁed criterion in question. This re-
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sult can be seen as a generalization of those obtained by Banerjee (2006) and implies some important
corollaries that the extensions a` la Banerjee of the inﬁnite-horizon leximin and the generalized Lorenz
welfare relations can be characterized by replacing Finite Anonymity withQ-Anonymity in the existing
characterization results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and deﬁnitions. In Sec-
tion 3, we brieﬂy review Banerjee’s (2006) extensions of the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs. In
Section 4, we present a formal deﬁnition of a simpliﬁed criterion and establish our main theorem. Sec-
tion 5 provides the characterizations of the Banerjee-like extensions of the leximin and the generalized
Lorenz welfare relations, and also an alternative characterization of theQ-utilitarian SWR, as corollaries
to our main theorem. Section 6 concludes.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let R denote the set of all real numbers and N the set of all positive integers f1; 2; : : : g. We letX ´ RN
be the domain of inﬁnite utility streams. An inﬁnite-dimensional vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ) is a typical
element of X . For all x 2 X and all n 2 N, we denote (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) by x¡n and (xn+1; xn+2; : : : )
by x+n. Thus, given any x 2 X and n 2 N, we can write x = (x¡n; x+n).
A SWR is a binary relation, %, onX which is reﬂexive and transitive, i.e. a quasi-ordering. We use,
as usual, Â to denote an asymmetric component of % and » a symmetric component of %, respectively,
i.e. x Â y if and only if x % y holds but y % x does not, and x » y if and only if x % y and y % x. A
SWR %A is a subrelation to a SWR %B if for x; y 2 X , (i) x »A y implies x »B y and (ii) x ÂA y
implies x ÂB y.
Following Mitra and Basu (2005) and Banerjee (2006), we represent any permutation by a per-
mutation matrix. A permutation matrix is an inﬁnite matrix P = (pij)i;j2N satisfying the following
properties
(i) For each i 2 N, there exists j(i) 2 N such that pij(i) = 1 and pij(i) = 0 for all j 6= j(i)
(ii) For each j 2 N, there exists i(j) 2 N such that pi(j)j = 1 and pi(j)j = 0 for all i 6= i(j).
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Given any permutation matrix P , we denote by P 0 its unique inverse which satisﬁes P 0P = PP 0 = I ,
where I denotes the inﬁnite identity matrix. We denote the set of all permutation matrices by P . Given
a permutation matrix P 2 P and n 2 N, we denote the n£n matrix (pij)i;j2f1;2;:::;ng by P (n). A ﬁnite
permutation matrix is a permutation matrix P such that there exists n 2 N such that (Px)+n = x+n.
The set of all ﬁnite permutation matrices is denoted by F .
As in the papers of Mitra and Basu (2005) and Banerjee (2006), we focus on a particular class of
cyclic permutations which deﬁnes a group under the usual matrix multiplication.6 A permutation matrix
P 2 P is said to be cyclic if, for any unit vector e = (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : :) 2 X , there exists k 2 N such
that k-times repeated applications of P to e generate e again, i.e. P ke = e. Throughout the paper, we let
Q = fP 2 P : there exists k 2 N such that for each n 2 N; P (nk) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation matrixg.7
It is easily checked thatQ is the class of cyclic permutations and deﬁnes a group (with respect to matrix
multiplication), and also that F µ Q.
Negation of a statement is indicated by the logical quantiﬁer :. Our notation for vector inequalities
on X is as follows. For all x; y 2 X , we write (i) x > y if xi ¸ yi for all i 2 N and (ii) x > y if x > y
and x 6= y.
3 F -Anonymous SWRs and Banerjee’s (2006)Q-anonymous extensions
In this section, we brieﬂy review Banerjee’s (2006) extensions of ﬁnitely anonymous SWRs. We should
begin with presenting the formal deﬁnition of the condition of Finite Anonymity. In the current frame-
work, Finite Anonymity is deﬁned as the condition that asserts social indifference relation for the pair
of utility streams which are related by a ﬁnite permutation matrix, P 2 F . In this paper, we call it F-
Anonymity.
F -Anonymity: For all x 2 X and all P 2 F , Px » x.
6Let G be a set of permutation matrices. G is said to deﬁne a group under the usual matrix multiplication if it satisﬁes the
following four properties: (i) for all P;Q 2 G, PQ 2 G, (ii) there exists I 2 G such that for all P 2 G, IP = PI = P , (iii)
for all P 2 G, there exists P 0 2 G such that P 0P = PP 0 = I , and (iv) for all P;Q;R 2 G, (PQ)R = P (QR).
7This class of permutations was ﬁrst introduced in Lauwers (1997b) and called ﬁxed step transformations. See also Fleur-
baey and Michel (2003).
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F-Anonymity formalizes an idea of impartial treatment of generations by using ﬁnite permutations.
A stronger impartiality requirement will be considered as follows.
P-Anonymity: For all x 2 X and all P 2 P , Px » x.
Apparently, P-Anonymity reﬂects an idea of impartial treatment of generations in the most strongest
form in our formalization using permutations. One reason why F-Anonymity, a weaker condition, is
usually adopted in the literature is that P-Anonymity is incompatible with the following usual efﬁciency
condition.8
Strong Pareto: For all x; y 2 X with x > y, x Â y.
F-Anonymity is surely compatible with Strong Pareto. In the literature, several F-anonymous and
strongly Paretian SWRs have been proposed, and moreover, characterization results have also been
established (see, for example, Svensson (1980), Asheim et al. (2001), Basu and Mitra (2007), and
Bossert et al. (2007)).9 Examples include the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs.
The Suppes-Sen SWR, denoted %S , is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %S y , there exists P 2 F such that Px > y:
The utilitarian SWR, %U , is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %U y , there exists n 2 N such that
Pn
i=1 xi ¸
Pn
i=1 yi and x
+n > y+n:
The former adopts Sen’s (1970) n-person generalization of Suppes’ (1966) grading principle in combina-
tion with the Pareto criterion for the inﬁnite future generations, and the latter combines the ﬁnite-horizon
utilitarian welfare relation with the Pareto criterion.
In the literature, it has often been argued that a stronger notion of anonymity than F-Anonymity is
needed to realize impartial treatment of all generations. The following two utility streams are usually
8On this, see Lemma 1 in Lauwers (1997a).
9In the literature on inﬁnite-horizon SWRs, the term “characterization” (of a certain SWR) is used to mean the characteri-
zation of all SWRs that include the SWR in question as a subrelation.
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considered to demonstrate that F-Anonymity is too weak to operationalize equal treatment of inﬁnitely
many generations:
x = (1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; : : :) and y = (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; : : :):
F-Anonymity, which is deﬁned in terms of ﬁnite permutations, cannot declare that x and y are equally
good, whereas such a prescription is intuitively appealing.
One plausible candidate which will provide such an conclusion is the following anonymity condition.
Q-Anonymity: For all x 2 X and all P 2 Q, Px » x.
Q-Anonymity was ﬁrst introduced by Lauwers (1997b) by the name Fixted Step Anonymity. This
anonymity condition is deﬁned in terms of a group of cyclic permutations. In the above example, y
is obtained through a 2-period cyclic permutation. Thus, Q-Anonymity declares that x and y are so-
cially indifferent. In their recent paper, Mitra and Basu (2005) established a striking characterization
that Q is the largest class of permutations in terms of which we can deﬁne the anonymity condition
which is compatible with Strong Pareto.10
Using the proﬁles x and y considered above, it is easily checked that neither of the Suppes-Sen and
the utilitarian SWRs satisﬁes Q-Anonymity. Thus, we need to explore new SWRs which satisfy Q-
Anonymity. Banerjee (2006) is the ﬁrst to formulate Q-anonymous SWRs and to establish the char-
acterizations of them.11 He provided the following extensions of the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian
SWRs.
The Q-Suppes-Sen SWR, denoted %QS , is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QS y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %S y:
10For other alternative stronger postulates of anonymity than F -Anonymity, see Lauwers (1995, 1998), Van Liedekerke and
Lauwers (1997), and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
11It should be noted that Q-anonymous SWRs are also proposed in Lauwers (1997b) and by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
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The Q-utilitarian SWR %QU is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QU y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %U y:
We refer to this type of extension of a F-anonymous SWR proposed by Banerjee (2006) as Q-
extension. He showed that the characterization of the Q-Suppes-Sen SWR %QS and the Q-utilitarian
SWR %QU , respectively, can be established by replacing F-Anonymity with Q-Anonymity in the set
of axioms which characterizes the Suppes-Sen SWR %S and the utilitarian SWR %U , respectively. We
refer the reader to Propositions 2 and 3 in Banerjee (2006) for details, and also to Svensson (1980) and
Asheim et al. (2001) for the axiomatization of the Suppes-Sen SWR and to Basu and Mitra (2007) for
that of the utilitarian SWR. We limit ourselves to note that the Suppes-Sen SWR is characterized in
terms of F-Anonymity and Strong Pareto and the utilitarian SWR is of F-Anonymity, Strong Pareto,
and an invariance condition called Partial Unit Comparability.
The purpose of this paper is to explore other newQ-anonymous SWRs and to provide the character-
izations of them. The rest of the paper is devoted to this task.
4 Characterization ofQ-extension of simpliﬁed criterion
Banerjee’s (2006) characterizations of the Q-extensions of the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs
suggest that aQ-extension of a certain kind of F-anonymous SWR would be characterized if we require
Q-Anonymity, a stronger anonymity condition, to be satisﬁed instead of F-Anonymity. We will show
that this is true for the class of SWRs, called simpliﬁed criterion, that includes several well-established
F-anonymous SWRs such as the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs as well as the Suppes-Sen
and the utilitarian SWRs.
The simpliﬁed criterion was ﬁrst categorized by d’Aspremont (2005). Let%n denote a ﬁnite-horizon
SWR deﬁned on Rn and (%n)1n=1 be a sequence of this ﬁnite-horizon SWR. The simpliﬁed criterion
is deﬁned in terms of a sequence of a ﬁnite-horizon SWR and the Pareto criterion applied to inﬁnite
future generations. Formally, a simpliﬁed criterion generated by a sequence (%n)1n=1, denoted %(%n),
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is deﬁned as the following binary relation on X: for any x; y 2 X ,
x %(%n) y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n: (1)
Each different simpliﬁed criterion %(%n) is distinguished in accordance with the adopted ﬁnite-horizon
SWR %n. A simpliﬁed criterion %(%n) is a ranking rule that applies the ﬁnite-horizon SWR %n to the
ﬁrst n generations and the Pareto criterion to the inﬁnite future generations starting from n + 1 period.
Obviously, the Suppes-Sen SWR%S and the utilitarian SWR%U , respectively is the simpliﬁed criterion
generated by the sequence of the ﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen SWR and the ﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWR,
respectively.
We provide a few remarks on a simpliﬁed criterion. First, there is no guarantee that a simpliﬁed
criterion deﬁned above in a general form will be a SWR even though the ﬁnite-horizon relation %n is a
SWR for each n 2 N. Indeed, there are some examples of ﬁnite-horizon SWR by which the generated
simpliﬁed criterion fails to be SWR, particularly leads to a violation of transitivity (see Footnote 13).
Since our interest lies on a reﬂexive and transitive simpliﬁed criterion, we limit our analysis to those
simpliﬁed criteria which are generated by a sequence of a ﬁnite-horizon SWR satisfying the following
two properties to assure the generated simpliﬁed criterion to be a SWR: one is
Property 1: For all n 2 N and all x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn with x¡n > y¡n, x¡n Ân y¡n;
and the other is
Property 2: For all n 2 N, all r 2 R, and all x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn, if x¡n %n y¡n, then (x¡n; r) %n+1
(y¡n; r).
Property 1 is the well-known strong Pareto condition deﬁned on Rn, and Property 2 is a kind of sep-
arability condition, which requires that adding an unconcerned generation has no relevant impact on
our evaluation and the ranking of the original pair of n-dimensional utility vectors must be respected in
that of the new (n + 1)-dimensional vectors.12 These two conditions together ensure that a generated
12Property 2 is similar to Existence Independence introduced by Blackorby et al. (2005) in the framework of variable
population social choice.
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simpliﬁed criterion be certainly a SWR.13 We now state the following remark.
Remark 1. For any sequence of a ﬁnite-horizon SWR (%n)1n=1 which satisﬁes Properties 1 and 2,
the generated simpliﬁed criterion %(%n) is a SWR. This can be easily checked as follows. Reﬂexivity
is straightforward. To conﬁrm %(%n) is transitive, consider any x; y; z 2 X such that x %(%n) y
and y %(%n) z. We will show x %(%n) z holds. By deﬁnition, there exist n; n0 2 N such that (i)
x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n and (ii) y¡n0 %n0 z¡n0 and y+n0 > z+n0 . Let ¹n = maxfn; n0g. Notice
that x+¹n > z+¹n. Thus, we are enough to show that x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n. By Property 2, x¡n %n y¡n implies
that (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n) %¹n y¡¹n. By Property 1, x¡¹n %¹n (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n). Thus, transitivity of
%¹n gives x¡¹n %¹n y¡¹n. By the same argument, we also obtain y¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n. Hence, by the transitivity
of %¹n, x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n follows. ¥
In the rest of the paper, we analyze a reﬂexive and transitive simpliﬁed criterion and itsQ-extension. To
distinguish an arbitrary simpliﬁed criterion (which may not be SWR) and reﬂexive and transitive one,
we hereafter use the term “simpliﬁed SWR” to mean a reﬂexive and transitive simpliﬁed criterion.
Next, we move to another remark on a simpliﬁed criterion. The following result is straightforward
from the deﬁnition of a simpliﬁed criterion and we omit the easy proof.
Remark 2. A simpliﬁed criterion generated by a sequence (%n)1n=1 satisﬁes F-Anonymity if and only
if, for each case of n 2 N, the adopted ﬁnite-horizon SWR%n satisﬁes the usual anonymity property de-
ﬁned on a ﬁnite domainRn: for all x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn, x¡n »n y¡n whenever x¡n is a permutation of y¡n.
¥
We now introduce the deﬁnition of aQ-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR generated by (%n)1n=1. AQ-
13The following examples of simpliﬁed criteria show that neither of Properties 1 and 2 can be dropped. The following
simpliﬁed criterion %¤: x %¤ y , there exists n 2 N such that min
i
x¡ni +
Pn
i=1 x
¡n
i ¸ min
i
y¡ni +
Pn
i=1 y
¡n
i and
x+n > y+n, satisﬁes Property 1 but not Property 2. %¤ fails to be transitive. This can be checked as follows. For x =
(3; 3; 0; 0; : : :); y = (0; 8; 0; 0; : : :); z = (0; 7; 0; 0; : : :), we have x »¤ y; y Â¤ z; but x »¤ z. Next, consider the following
simpliﬁed criterion %¤¤: x %¤¤ y, there exists n 2 N such thatPni=1 x¡ni ·Pni=1 y¡ni and x+n > y+n. This simpliﬁed
criterion satisﬁes Property 2 but not Property 1. Then, it fails to be transitive: for x = (0; 3; 0; 0; : : :); y = (1; 1; 0; 0; : : :); z =
(2; 1; 0; 0; : : :), we have x »¤¤ y; y Â¤¤ z; but x »¤¤ z.
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extension of a simpliﬁed SWR %(%n), denoted %Q(%n), is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %Q(%n) y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %(%n) y: (2)
As will be shown later, %Q(%n) is a SWR.
The main result established in this paper is that anyQ-extension of a F-anonymous simpliﬁed SWR
is characterized by only replacing F-Anonymity with Q-Anonymity in the set of the conditions that
characterizes the F-anonymous simpliﬁed SWR in question. To state the result formally, let A(%(%n))
denote the set of conditions which characterizes the simpliﬁed SWR %(%n). We are now ready to state
our main result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a simpliﬁed SWR %(%n) on X satisﬁes F-Anonymity. Then, a SWR % on X
satisﬁes Q-Anonymity and all the conditions in A(%(%n)) if and only if %Q(%n) is a subrelation to %.14
The proof proceeds through the following two lemmata.
Lemma 1. For any P 2 Q and any x; y 2 X , we have
x Â(%n) y if and only if Px Â(%n) Py (3)
and
x »(%n) y if and only if Px »(%n) Py: (4)
Proof. We will show that x %(%n) y if and only if Px %(%n) Py, from which the equivalence assertions
in (3) and (4) immediately follow.
(only if part) Assume x %(%n) y. Then, there exists n 2 N such that
x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n:
14Recall that Q-Anonymity logically implies F-Anonymity. Thus, F -Anonymity is now redundant and we can drop it if it
is included in the list A(%(%n)).
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Without loss of generality, let P be a k-period cyclic permutation matrix. We want to show that
Px %(%n) Py. Since P 2 Q µ S , we can ﬁnd n^ 2 N such that kn^ ¸ n and P (kn^) is a ﬁnite
dimensional permutation matrix. Let n0 = kn^. We consider the following proﬁles x0; y0 2 X:
x0 = (x¡n
0
; (Px)+n
0
) and y0 = (y¡n
0
; (Py)+n
0
):
Since x¡n = x0¡n and y¡n = y0¡n, we obtain x0¡n %n y0¡n. Moreover, from x+n > y+n, we have
(xn+1; : : : ; xn0) > (yn+1; : : : ; yn0) and (Px)+n
0 > (Py)+n0 , i.e. x0+n > y0+n holds. Thus, x0 %(%n) y0
follows. Since %(%n) is F-anonymous, x0 »(%n) Px and y0 »(%n) Py. From transitivity of %(%n),
Px %(%n) Py is obtained as desired.
(if part) Assume Px %(%n) Py. Since P 0 2 Q, using the “only if” part of the lemma, we obtain
x %(%n) y. ¥
Lemma 2. For any x; y 2 X ,
x ÂQ(%n) y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â(%n) y (5)
and
x »Q(%n) y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px »(%n) y: (6)
Proof. We prove the equivalence assertion in (5). The proof of (6) is straightforward from (5) and the
deﬁnition of %Q(%n), and we omit easy proof.
Note that, by the deﬁniton of %Q(%n), x ÂQ(%n) y is equivalent to
9P 2 Q such that Px %(%n) y (7)
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and
8Q 2 Q;:(Qy %(%n) x): (8)
(only if part) Assume x ÂQ(%n) y. The proof is done by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
P 2 Q such that Px »(%n) y. By (4), x = P 0(Px) »(%n) P 0y. This implies P 0y %(%n) x, which
contradicts (8). By (7), there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â(%n) y.
(if part) Assume that there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â(%n) y. From the deﬁnition of %Q(%n),
x %Q(%n) y. We want to show :(y %Q(%n) x). The proof is done by contradiction. Suppose y %Q(%n)
x. Then, there exists Q 2 Q such that Qy %(%n) x. By Lemma 1, P (Qy) %(%n) Px. From transitivity
of %(%n) and Px %(%n) y, P (Qy) Â(%n) y. Let R denote the product PQ. Note that R 2 Q. Without
loss of generality, let R be a k-period cyclic permutation matrix. By the deﬁnition of %(%n), there exists
n 2 N such that (Ry)¡n %n y¡n and (Ry)+n > y+n. Since R 2 Q µ S, we can ﬁnd n0 2 N such
that n0 ¸ n and n0 = kn^ for some n^ 2 N. The anonymous %n0 declares (Ry)¡n0 »n0 y¡n0 . If we
have (Ry)+n
0
= y+n
0
, Ry »(%n) y follows, and a contradiction is obtained. Thus, (Ry)+n0 > y+n0
holds. Now, we distinguish two cases: (i) the vector inequality (Ry)+n
0
> y+n
0
contains ﬁnite strict
inequalities, or (ii) it contains inﬁnite strict inequalities. First, we consider the case (i). In this case, we
can ﬁnd n00 2 N such that n00 ¸ n0, n00 = k ^^n for some ^^n ¸ n^, and (Ry)+n00 = y+n00 . Since %n00 is
anonymous, (Ry)¡n00 »n00 y¡n00 . Therefore, by the deﬁnition of %(%n), we have Ry »(%n) y which
contradicts Ry Â(%n) y. Next, we examine the case (ii). In this case, we can ﬁnd some ~n > n^ such that
(Ryk~n+1; : : : ; Ryk(~n+1)) > (yk~n+1; : : : ; yk(~n+1)). This contradicts the fact that R is a k-period cyclic
permutation matrix. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1. (only if part) Assume that a SWR % on X satisﬁes Q-Anonymity and all the
conditions inA(%(%n)). Recall that the unique inverse of P 2 Q is denoted by P 0. Assume x ÂQ(%n) y.
We want to show x Â y. By (5), there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â(%n) y. Note that Q-Anonymity
implies F-Anonymity. Thus, % now satisﬁes all the conditions in A(%(%n)). Consequently, % includes
%(%n) as a subrelation. This together with Px Â(%n) y implies Px Â y. Since % is Q-anonymous,
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x = P 0(Px) » Px. From transitivity of %, x Â y is obtained as desired. Next, assume x »Q(%n) y.
We want to show x » y. By (6), there exists P 2 Q such that Px »(%n) y. Since %(%n) is a subrelation
to %, Px » y. By Q-Anonymoity, x = P 0(Px) » Px. Transitivity of % implies x » y. This shows
that %Q(%n) is a subrelation to %.
(if part) Assume that %Q(%n) is a subrelation to %. We are enough to show that %Q(%n) satisﬁes
Q-Anonymity and all the conditions in A(%(%n)). By Lemma 2 and the fact that I 2 Q, %(%n) is a
subrelation to%Q(%n), which in turn implies that %Q(%n) satisﬁes all the conditions inA(%(%n)). As to
Q-Anonymity, it is obvious by the deﬁnition of %Q(%n) and the fact that %(%n) is reﬂexive. ¥
By Lemma 1, we can conﬁrm that %Q(%n) is a SWR. Reﬂexivity is straightforward from the fact
that I 2 Q and %(%n) is reﬂexive. We show that %Q(%n) is transitive. Assume that x %Q(%n) y and
y %Q(%n) z. Then, by deﬁnition, there exist P;Q 2 Q such that Px %(%n) y and Qy %(%n) z. By
Lemma 1, Px %(%n) y , Q(Px) %(%n) Qy. Thus, the transitivity of %(%n) gives Q(Px) %(%n) z,
and x %Q(%n) z follows from the fact that QP 2 Q.
As discussed in Basu and Mitra (2007) and Banerjee (2006), our theorem 1 can be interpreted as
saying that %Q(%n) is the least restrictive SWR among all the SWRs that satisfy Q-Anonymity and all
the conditions in A(%(%n)). Formally, for all x; y 2 X , we have
x %Q(%n) y if and only if x % y for all %2 ¥Q(%n); (9)
where ¥Q(%n) is the set of all SWRs that satisfy Q-Anonymity and all the conditions in A(%(%n)).
The only if part of (9) is obvious from the only if statement of the theorem. The if part of (9) is also
straightforward from the fact that%Q(%n)2 ¥Q(%n) (this fact is easily checked: Q-Anonymity is obvious
by the deﬁnition of %Q(%n); for the conditions in A(%(%n)), recall that I 2 Q).
Our characterization of a Q-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR is established in a general form, and it
can be applicable to any F-anonymous simpliﬁed criterion. The next section provides some characteri-
zations of Q-extensions of F-anonymous simpliﬁed SWRs as corollaries.
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5 Corollaries
5.1 Characterizations of Q-extensions of the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs
In this section, we provide some corollaries to Theorem 1. We start with introducing an additional
notation. For n 2 N and x 2 X , let (x¡n(1) ; x¡n(2) ; : : : ; x¡n(n)) denote a rank-ordered permutation of x¡n
such that x¡n(1) · x¡n(2) · ¢ ¢ ¢ · x¡n(n), ties being broken arbitrarily.
In their recent paper, Bossert et al. (2007) proposed the two simpliﬁed SWRs called the generalized
Lorenz SWR and the leximin SWR, and also they established the characterizations of them.
The generalized Lorenz SWR %G is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %G y ,
8>><>>:
there exists n 2 N such that Pkt=1 x¡n(t) ¸Pkt=1 y¡n(t) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, and
x+n > y+n:
For all n 2 N, let %nL denote the leximin social welfare relation deﬁned on Rn as follows: for all
x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn,
x¡n %nL y¡n ,
8>><>>:
x¡n is a permutation of y¡n, or
there existsm 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that x¡n(t) = y¡n(t) for all t < m and x¡n(m) > y¡n(m):
The leximin SWR %L is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %L y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nL y¡n and x+n > y+n:
Bossert et al. (2007) characterizes the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs using the following
consequentialist equity conditions.
Pigou-Dalton Equity Principle: For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) yi < xi · xj < yj
and xi ¡ yi = yj ¡ xj , and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x Â y.
Hammond Equity Principle: For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) yi < xi · xj < yj ,
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and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x Â y.
Both two axioms are stated in a conﬂicting situation between only two generations.15 Pigou-Dalton
Equity Principle asserts that an order-preserving transfer from a relatively better-off generation to a rel-
atively worse-off generation, i.e. the well-known Pigou-Dalton transfer, is strictly socially preferable.
Hammond Equity Principle is an inﬁnite-horizon extension of the equity condition formulated by Ham-
mond (1976, 1979) in the ﬁnite population case. This condition is logically stronger than Pigou-Dalton
Equity Principle. It asserts that an order-preserving change which diminishes inequality of utilities be-
tween conﬂicting two generations is strictly socially improving, whereas Pigou-Dalton Equity Principle
agrees to such a value judgment as long as utility differences of conﬂicting two generations are equal.
Bossert et al. (2007) established the following characterizations of the generalized Lorenz and the
leximin SWRs.
Proposition 1 (Bossert et al. (2007), Theorems 1 and 2). (i) A SWR % on X satisﬁes Strong Pareto, F-
Anonymity, and Pigou-Dalton Equity Principle if and only if %G is a subrelation to %.
(ii) A SWR % on X satisﬁes Strong Pareto, F-Anonymity, and Hammond Equity Principle if and only if
%L is a subrelation to %.
Since the generalized Lorenz and the leximin SWRs, respectively, is the simpliﬁed SWRs generated
by the sequence of the ﬁnite-horizon generalized Lorenz SWR and of the ﬁnite-horizon leximin SWR
respectively, we can apply our Theorem 1 to establish the characterizations of the Q-extensions of these
two simpliﬁed SWRs. In view of the deﬁnition of the Q-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR in (2), the
deﬁnitions of their Q-extensions are straightforward.
Q-generalized Lorenz relation, denoted %QG, is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QG y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %G y:
15The weak versions of the conditions are also considered in the literrature. On this, we refer the reader to d’Aspremont and
Gevers (2002) for a ﬁnite population case and to Bossert et al. (2007) for an inﬁnite case.
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Q-leximin relation %QL is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QL y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %L y:
We now state the following characterizations as corollaries to our Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. (i) A SWR % on X satisﬁes Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, and Pigou-Dalton Equity Prin-
ciple if and only if %QG is a subrelation to %.
(ii) A SWR % on X satisﬁes Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, and Hammond Equity Principle if and only if
%QL is a subrelation to %.
5.2 Alternative characterization of Q-utilitarian SWR
Finally, we provide an alternative characterization of the Q-extension of the utilitarian SWR. We now
introduce an inﬁnite-horizon extension of the Incremental Equitywhich was ﬁrst proposed by Blackorby
et al. (2002) in a ﬁnite population setting.
Incremental Equity Principle: For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) xi¡yi = yj¡xj >
0, and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x » y.
It is easily checked that Incremental Equity Principle logically implies F-Anonymity. In contrast to
Pigou-Dalton Equity Principle, this condition asserts much stronger and somewhat controversial value
judgment that, for any transfer among two generations, the initial utility stream and the post-transfer
stream are considered to be equally good without any reference to the relative utility levels of conﬂicting
two generations.
The following proposition tells that this condition clearly distinguishes the utilitarian SWR from the
other strongly Paretian SWRs.
Proposition 2. A SWR % on X satisﬁes Strong Pareto and Incremental Equity Principle if and only if
%U is a subrelation to %.
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Proof. Step 1.16 We show that x » y holds whenever there exists n 2 N such thatPni=1 xi =Pni=1 yi
and x+n = y+n. The case of n = 1 is trivial. If n ¸ 2, consider the following operation: ﬁx
n0 2 f1; : : : ; n¡ 1g arbitrarily and construct x0 2 X as follows: x0n0 = yn0 for n0; x0n = xn + x0n0 ¡ yn0
for n; x0k = xk for all k 2 N n fn0; ng. Applying the above operation once for each n0 2 f1; : : : ; n¡ 1g
repeatedly, we can construct the proﬁle y. Incremental Equity Principle and transitivity of % together
conclude x » y.
Step 2. From Step 1, it is obvious that x »U y ) x » y. We show x ÂU y ) x Â y. Assume
x ÂU y. Then, there exists n 2 N such that (
Pn
i=1 xi; x
+n) > (
Pn
i=1 yi; y
+n). We can ﬁnd n0 ¸ n
such that
Pn0
i=1 xi >
Pn0
i=1 yi and x
+n0 > y+n0 . Deﬁne z 2 X as z1 = y1 +
Pn0
i=1(xi ¡ yi), zi = yi
for all i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; n0g, and zj = xj for all j 2 fn0 + 1; : : : g. From the result in Step 1, x » z. By
Strong Pareto, z Â y. From transitivity of %, x Â y. ¥
In view of Proposition 2, we immediately obtain the following characterization of the Q-utilitarian
SWR as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. A SWR % onX satisﬁes Strong Pareto,Q-Anonymity, and Incremental Equity Principle if
and only if %QU is a subrelation to %.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we established the characterization of aQ-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR in a general form.
Our characterization makes clear the logical relationship between a simpliﬁed SWR and itsQ-extension.
From Theorem 1, the difference between a simpliﬁed SWR and its Q-extension is solely ascribed to the
extent of impartial treatment of inﬁnitely many generations: in a Q-anonymous way or only in a F-
anonymous way. In other words, if we require the stronger notion of impartiality formalized as Q-
Anonymity to be reﬂected in addition to the conditions characterizing a certain F-anonymous simpliﬁed
SWR, we must respect the ranking determined by the Q-extension of the simpliﬁed SWR in question.
As we brieﬂy mentioned in the introduction, from Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) theorem,
16The result we demonstrate in this step is well-known fact. See, for example, Blackorby et al. (2002, 2005) for the ﬁnite
society case, and also Asheim and Tungodden (2004) for the inﬁnite horizon case.
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we can conclude that, for any F-anonymous simpliﬁed SWR %(%n), there exists an ordering on inﬁnite
utility streams which satisﬁes all the conditions in A(%(%n)) and Q-Anonymity. Therefore, our result
can be regarded as a stronger existence theorem of strongly Paretian and anonymous ordering than the
existing characterizations of F-anonymous simpliﬁed SWRs, which could be seen as an alternative and
stronger resolution to Diamond’s (1965) impossibility result as well.
AQ-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR is one plausible way to improve the completeness of the simpli-
ﬁed SWR. AQ-extension of a simpliﬁed SWR is, however, still incomplete welfare relation. Thus, there
still be room for improvement to the completeness of social evaluation. As we noted earlier, Mitra and
Basu (2005) showed that the largest class of inﬁnite permutation matrices compatible with Strong Pareto
is a group of cyclic permutation matrices, i.e. Q. Therefore, if a social planner thinks of Strong Pareto
andQ-Anonymity as indispensable condition to be satisﬁed in the social evaluation of intergenerational
issues, more complete social evaluation would be possible only through strengthening or additionally
employing conditions other than Strong Pareto and Q-Anonymity. This task is left for future work.
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